Interdiction and silence: two approaches on the impossible in language

Abstract

This article carries out an epistemological and logical investigation on language, following the principles of discourse analysis as proposed by Pêcheux, as a means of examining the logical conditions for the existence of language. In order to reach that goal, we believe it is necessary to reach the boundary of language, i.e., silence. We argue that not only silence, but also interdiction, are both structural and constitutive conditions for the existence of language. Our main argument is that, in order to say something, other sayings have to be silenced, both in a structural and a local sense (censorship). Following these trends, we consider silence as a necessary but not sufficient cause of saying. The logical setting for uttering becomes sufficient only when interdiction is added to it. The verification of the conditions of language existence requires an investigation that goes beyond the imaginary meanings of discourse, language and sayings, and that is the reason why we chose the logical and not the historical approach, although we still consider that history remains crucially important to discourse analysis.